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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ARLIEAN VICKERS BARRETT 
and GEORGE C. BARRETT, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
LELAND H. VICKERS, 
Defendant and Respondent, Case No. 
11787 
STERLING D. VICKERS and 
ETHELYN VICKERS, his wife, 
Defendants, 
JOSEPH S. BARRETT and 
ETHEL V. BARRETT, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the plaintiffs Arliean Vickers 
Barrett and George C. Barrett for partition of property 
in which each of the parties hereto has an interest or 
I 
for the sale of the property and division of the proceeds 
ancl for an accounting of the equities of the parties in 
the property. 
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
Trial was had before the Honorable C. Nelson Day, 
Judge of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial Dis-
trict in and for Juab County. The Judge entered an 
order granting the plaintiffs the George C. Barretts a 
judgment against the estate of Leland H. Vickers, de-
ceased, for the sum of $34.25; and a judgment against 
the defendant Ethelyn Vickers Johnson, as successor 
in interest of defendants Sterling D. Vickers, deceased, 
and Ethelyn Vickers for the sum of $27.70. Judgment 
was awarded in favor of the defendant Joseph S. Bar-
rett as successor in interest of the defendants Joseph 
S. Barrett and Ethel V. Barrett, deceased, against the 
estate of Leland H. Vickers, deceased, for the sum of 
$1,007.16; and in favor of the said defendant Joseph 
S. Barrett against the plaintiffs the George C. Barretts 
for the sum of $665.58. Finally a judgment was entered 
partitioning the property known as the Old Vickers 
Ranch east of Nephi, Utah, between the four principal 
interests as more specifically outlined on page 2 of the 
Judgment (R page 51). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks an order remanding the action 
to the District Court for further trial and proper dis-
2 
position relative to the amounts of the judgments 
granted in favor of the appellant which judgments the 
appellant alleges to be deficient and with respect to the 
partition of the property which the appellant alleges to 
be in error, or in the alternative, should this court deter-
mine the facts as revealed by the exhibits and testimony 
of witnesses to be sufficiently clear to allow a final dis-
position of the case, for a determination of the proper 
amounts due and owing and an order remanding the 
case to the District Court for entry of judgment as 
specifically determined and outlined by this court so as 
to conclude this litigation which has now been pending 
for 28 years. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The preliminary facts out of which this case arose 
are amply set out in the case of Barrett vs. Vickers, 116 
P.2d 772, 100 Utah 534 (1941). In that case the Su-
preme Court upheld the decision of Judge Will L. 
Hoyt to the effect that each of the four interest holders 
or pairs of interest holders owned an undivided one-
fourth interest in and to the contract with the State 
Land Board (defendant's Exhibit 2) . The present ac-
tion was commenced by Arliean Vickers Barrett and 
George C. Barrett to partition the property or to sell 
the property and divide the proceeds in 1942. Trial was 
had, however, judgment was not rendered thereafter by 
the trial court until December 21, 1960 by which judg-
ment the court decreed the property could not be par-
3 
tioned without substantial injury to the property and 
the rights of the parties. The court did not, however, 
enter a decree that the property be sold. 
The parties were dissatisfied with the judgment 
and again brought their problem before the Utah Su-
preme Court. (Barrett vs. Vickers, 362 P.2d 586, 12 
Utah 2d 73 ( 1961) ) . This court stated in its opinion 
on that case: 
It is obvious that where a co-tenancy is unde-
sirable to one or more of the parties and they 
cannot agree upon a solution to the problems it 
presents there must be some method of terminat-
ing it. To meet such exigencies our statutes pro-
vide that when an action is brought the court 
'must order a partition according to the respec-
tive rights of the parties,' or alternatively upon 
proof 'to the satisfaction of the court, that ... 
the partition cannot be made without great pre-
judice to the owners, the court may order a sale 
thereof.' The proceeds must then be allocated 
according to the interests of the parties. A co-
tenant who has properly invoked the aid of this 
statute is entitled to one or the other of these 
remedies as a matter of right. The failure of the 
court to grant either was error and this case must 
be remanded for determination of what should 
be done in that regard. 
The case was retried September 17, 1962 by a dif-
ferent judge, the judge who had originally tried the 
case having retired, but again judgment was delayed 
and was not finally rendered on the matter until June 
21, 1969 (R pp. 50-52). 
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From the time this action was first commenced in 
to the present time the parties have been in con-
stant controversy resulting in a variety of additional 
lawsuits between the parties as to personal claims. All 
personal claims were excluded by the trial court in its 
pretrial order, (R. pp. 1-2) which was read into the tran-
script at page 16 and interpreted further at page 17. 
Following the original lawsuit and the determination of 
the interests of the parties in and to the contract the 
rarious parties made sporadic payments sufficient to 
maintain the group rights with the State Land Board 
but resulting in a confusion of equities, rights and in-
terests which would tax the wits of the most qualified 
accountant. 
The trial judge in 1945 finally recommended that 
somebody pay off the State Land Board in an effort 
to reduce the complications of the contract. This was 
done in 1945 and 1946 when Ethelyn Yickers and Ster-
ling Yickers paid what was estimated to be the balance 
of their share and Ethel V. Barrett and Joseph S. Bar-
rett paid the balance of the contract to the State Land 
Board (plaintiff's Exhibit F, State's Exhibit A, and 
plaintiff's Exhibit Q). 
Y arious improvements were made upon the proper-
ty, principal among which was the repair of the dam 
which had been washed out by a flood (Tr. pp. 86-87) 
and which necessitated placing the entire farm under 
cultivation to obtain Federal assistance (Tr. pp. 94, 95 
and 224). This was done by Joseph S. Barrett (Tr. 
pp. 94, 96 and 100). 
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The details of the contributions made by the de. 
fondant Joseph S. Barrett and his wife and the im-
provements made by him are more specifically outlined 
with specific references to the record and transcript in 
those portions of this brief which deal with the point& 
of alleged error on the part of the trial judge in ruling 
contrary to the evidence at the trial. 
The testimony with regard to whether or not the 
property could be partitioned was conflicting and am-
biguous (Tr. pp. 76, 150, 182, 185, 189, 190, 200). The 
plaintiff, George C. Barrett testified that the temporary 
division was not entirely satisfactory, (Tr. 200) and 
that he would not be interested in any of the divided 
portions, but that which he had specifically chosen for 
his own use (Tr. 189). 
The court did not appoint referees to determine 
how the property should be divided. 
The court filed a memorandwn opinion on January 
3, 1969 (R. pp. 29-30) which resulted in objections from 
both the plaintiffs and the defendant, Joseph S. Barrett, 
individually and as successor in interest of the defendant, 
Ethel Y. Barrett (R. pp. 31-36), following which an 
informal conference was held between counsel for the 
parties and the court and being unable to resolve the 
differences informally, a formal hearing was scheduled 
and argument had relative to the objections filed. There-
after, the court entered its Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law and Judgment on June 21, 1969 (R. 
pp. 44-52) in which it abandoned its memorandum deci-
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sion and awarded additional property to the George C. 
Barretts. This additional property was obtained from 
portions previously allotted to defendant Leland IL 
Yickers Estate under the memorandum decision in re-
turn for which certain property previously allocated to 
.T oseph S. Barrett under the memorandum decision was 
allocated to the Leland H. Vickers Estate, along with 
some grazing land formerly allocated to the George C. 
Barretts. 
The parties had, while the action was pending, 
divided the cultivatable property between themselves in 
a manner which although not satisfactory to any of the 
parties, (Tr. pp. 23, 76, 189, 200) had permitted some 
workable basis for use of the property during the long 
pendency of this action. The trial court followed this 
division to some degree in the judgment and divided 
the property based upon Findings of Fact No. 2, page 
1 that each of the parties was entitled to an undivided 
one-fourth interest in and to the property (R. p. 45) 
and on the theory that the property allocated to each 
was an approximation of one-fourth of the monetary 
value of the farm. 
The court found the reasonable value of the per-
manent improvements erected on the property by Joseph 
S. Barrett was $260.00 ( R. p. 46) and the court set out 
in Paragraph 6 of the Findings of Fact the propor-
tionate credits allowed to each of the parties for pay-
ments made toward the contract including a considera-
tion of the judgment rendered in 1940 by Judge Hoyt 
(R. p. 45). 
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During the pendency of this action the defendant 
Sterling D. Vickers passed away and his wife Ethelyn 
Vickers has remarried and is now Ethelyn Vickers 
Johnson. The defendant Leland H. Vickers has passed 
away and the plaintiff Arliean Vickers Barrett has been 
appointed as Administratrix of his estate and appeared 
at the trial of this action in 1962 both as plaintiff and 
as defendant in her capacity as Administratrix of the 
estate of Leland H. Vickers. The defendant Ethel V. 
Barrett became incompetent and was such during the 
trial of the case in 1962 with the defendant Joseph S. 
Barrett representing her interests as guardian. After 
the trial of the case in 1962 the defendant Ethel V. 
Barrett passed away and the defendant Joseph S. Bar-
rett is her successor in interest herein. The defendant 
Joseph S. Barrett has himself subsequently remarried. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS 
AS TO THE AMOUNT OF PAYMENTS MADE 
BY EACH OF THE CO-TENANTS. 
The payments of each of the co-tenants are set out 
in plaintiff's Exhibit F (which carries two sets) and 
State's Exhibit A. Appendix "A" hereto is an outline 
of payments of each of the parties by date and and the 
amount paid as consolidated from the three statements 
of the State Land Board. The reconciliation of these 
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three sets of records of payment, commencing subse-
quent to the judgment of Judge Hoyt in favor of the 
plaintiffs against the parties in the total amount of 
$119.89, show that the defendant George C. Barrett 
paid an additional $508.69 not $716.54 as set out by the 
court. The defendant Sterling D. Vickers and Ethelyn 
Yickers paid an additional $868.71 not $836.41 as set 
out by the court and the defendant Joseph S. Barrett 
and Ethel V. Barrett paid an additional $2,085.94 not 
$2,051. 93 as set out by .the court. Only the contributions 
of the defendant Leland H. Vickers were correct as 
outlined by the court. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN TAKING JUDGE 
HOYT'S JUDGMENT INTO ACCOUNT IN 
COMPUTING CREDITS AND EQUITIES OF 
THE PARTIES. 
The judgment of $119.89 net against the three 
defendants in favor of the plaintiffs should not have 
been taken into account by the trial court in the compu-. 
tations of subsequent credits and equities of the parties 
but rather should be considered separately as a judg-
ment against each defendant based upon Judge Hoyt's 
breakdown as to the liability of each defendant as set 
forth in Paragraph 3 of Page 3 of the Judge's August 
15, 1940 decree (Defendant's Exhibit No. 2). 
Defendant Joseph S. Barrett and his wife Ethel 
Y. Barrett would be charged with $70.16 less one-third 
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of the total 'costs' of $96.70 awarded by the trial court 
and the Supreme Court leaving a net judgment in favor 
of the plaintiffs, the George C. Barretts in the amount of 
$37.93 plus interest thereon at the rate of 8 per cent 
per annum from the date of that judgment until paid. 
It is noted that no effort has been made to enforce 
that judgment by execution proceedings or otherwise 
and that as a matter of law that judgment has been 
barred since August 15, 1948 since it has never been re-
newed. (Section 78-12-22 Utah Code Annotated as 
amended.) The plaintiff cannot now revive that judg-
ment by attempting to consolidate it as a credit in the 
present action. That judgment was a separate, distinct, 
and enforceable judgment from the date it was incurred 
until it expired by limitations in 1948, fourteen years 
prior to the commencement of the trial which is the 
subject of the present appeal. 
POINT Ill 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
THE LELAND H. VICKERS ESTATE AN 
OFF-SET IN THE A.MOUNT OF $450.00. 
The court allowed $450.00 as the reasonable value 
of work and labor performed by defendant Leland H. 
Vickers for and on behalf of defendants Joseph S. Bar· 
rett and Ethel V. Barrett (R. p. 46). 
In the first instance there was no testimony of any 
kind entered in the trial of the case as to the extent, if 
10 
any, of the specific services performed by Leland H. 
Y ickers, although there were some references to in di-. 
\·i<lual dealings (Tr. pp. 80, 83, 84, 111, and 130) . .Fur-
ther, there was no testimony whatsoever given at trial 
as to the value of services, labor or work performed, if 
any. by Leland H. Vickers for and on behalf of Joseph 
S. Barrett or Ethel V. Barrett. Nor was there any 
evidence as to any agreed compensation for services. 
In the absence of any evidence whatsoever as to 
services performed, if any, and the value of services per-
formed, the court certainly cannot arbitrarily arrh-e at 
some estimate of the extent of services or the agreed 
compensation for services, if any, and/or of the value to 
be placed thereon. Likewise, it is equally clear the court 
cannot draw from sources outside the record to estab-
lish the extent of services, if any, or the value thereof 
\Tucker Realty vs. Nunley, 396 P.2d 410, 16 Utah 2d 
97 ( 1964) ) . 
There were obviously a variety of dealings and 
disputes between the defendant Joseph Barrett and his 
wife, Ethel, and the defendant, Leland H. Vickers, 
(Tr. pp. 80, 83, 84, Ill and 130), all of which trans-
aetions resulted in a lawsuit which was eventually settled 
through court action in which all personal services were 
taken into account (Tr. pp. 125, 126, and 127). (The 
lawsuit referred to was Joseph S. Barrett vs. Leland S. 
Yickers, Civil No. 3769 in the District Court of the 
Fifth Judicial District in and for Juab County. The 
case was dismissed with prejudice on stipulation of par-
11 
ties in 1958.) Further, Joseph S. Barrett testified with-
out contradiction or opposing evidence of any kind that 
Leland H. Vickers did not perform any services in re-
turn for money advanced for payment on the property 
or for improvements made to the property and that ail 
services which were performed were in return for per-
sonal claims of the parties which had been settled in the 
action above referred to (Tr. pp. 127 and 131). 
Thus evidence of any such claims, if there had been 
any would be precluded by res adjudicata as having been 
determined and concluded in the action previously filed 
and settled between the parties. 
In addition to the above the court's own finding in 
Paragraph 11 of the Findings of Fact would bar con-
sideration of this purported off set. In Paragraph I I of 
the court's Findings of Fact (R. p. 47) the court stated: 
• 
That the adjudication of this case involves only 
an adjudication as to the right to partition the 
property involved herein and a settlement of the 
claims between the parties for the cost of said 
property and the cost of the permanent improve-
ments which were errected thereon but does n-0t 
involve an adjudication of any other claims which 
the parties may have had o.r to 
against the others which sazd claims were specifi· 
cally excluded. ( e.a.) 
The court's finding is amply substantiated by the tran· 
script (Tr. pp. 13, 16 and 17) . 
It is eminently clear therefore that even if there 
had been testimony and evidence as to the extent of the 
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work and labor performed, if any, by Leland H. Vickers 
0n behalf of Joseph S. Barrett and his wife and/or as 
to the value thereof, by the court's own ruling that testi-
mony would be beyond the scope of the case and would 
be excluded from consideration. 
POINT IV 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT PREPARED 
BY THE TRIAL COURT CONSTITUTE 
ERROR. 
The Findings of Fact do not set out a basis from 
which it can be determined how they were derived. 
There is no accounting made available by the court to 
show what rate of interest was charged, for what periods 
of time, on what specific contribution. The parties are 
thus left with no way by which the findings can be 
reconciled with the record and the transcript of the 
testimony taken in the trial of the case. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN HIS COMPUTA-
TIONS OF THE AMOUNTS OWED BY EACH 
OF THE PARTIES TO THE DEFENDANT 
.JOSEPH S. BARRETT. 
The credits to which each of the parties is entitled 
is a technical accounting question on which the court 
should have appointed an accountant as a referee to 
make the necessary computations. The court apparently 
13 
attempted to do this without the aid of special skills 
of an accountant in spite of the explicit suggestion of 
this court in Barrett vs. Barrett, 362 P.2d 586 12 Utah 
2d 73 (1961) that the trial court appoint a referee for 
this purpose. As a result the trial court was unable to 
resolve the accolillting problem. 
Appendix "B" is an accountant's computation as to 
credits for each of the parties, commencing with the 
payments of October 5, 1940. The payments prior to 
that date having been resolved and consolidated into 
Judge Hoyt's Judgment of August 15, 1940. The 
accountant has divided the liability into four equal parts 
and credited each party with payments as and when 
made by him and charged each party with interest at 
the rate of four per cent per annum on all unpaid prin-
cipal prior to the due date of any installment thereon 
and eight per cent per annum on past due installments 
and interest as outlined by the contract (Defendant's 
Exhibit 1) . After the point where the contract was 
paid off to the State Land Board, pursuant to the trial 
court's Conclusion of Law No. 1, (R. p. 44) the defend-
ant Joseph S. Barrett has been subrogated to the rights 
of the State Land Board as against the parties who 
are in arrears in their payments on the contract. He is 
thereafter entitled to all amounts then due and owing 
to the State Land Board, together with all amounts 
thereafter becoming due and owing with interest at the 
rate of four per cent per annum on all unpaid install-
ments of principal not yet due and interest at the rate 
of eight per cent per annum on all past due installments 
14 
,if principal and interest. The accountant did not com-
pound the eight per cent per annum interest charged on 
past due principal and interest. 
The amount therefor due and owing to the de-
frrnlant Joseph S. Barrett by the plaintiffs the George 
C. Barretts as of the date of the court's Findings of Fact 
a11<l Conclusions of Law and Judgment on June 21, 
19()9, was $1,152.56 for contributions toward the pur-
chase price of the property, not $536.88 as found by 
the court. The amount due and owing to the defendant 
.Joseph S. Barrett by the estate of Leland H. Yickers 
was $2,231.61 for contributions toward the purchase 
price of the property not $878.46 as found by the court. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE 
\'ALCE OF THE IlHPROYEMENTS )!ADE 
FPON THE PROPERTY BY JOSEPH S. BAR-
HET 'VAS $260.00. 
The evidence was clear that the dam alone cost 
of which amount only Mrs. Johnson paid her 
one-fourth share to the defendant Joseph S. Barrett 
(Tr. pp. 86 and 87). There is no evidence or testimony 
to the contrary. There is no question but that the dam 
was, and that the court intended to find the dam was a 
permanent improvement and a necessary expenditure 
to preserve the value of the property. 
In order to obtain the participation of the Federal 
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government for the repair of the dam, it was necessarv 
the entire farm be placed under cultivation (Tr. p;. 
94, 95 and 224). This Joseph S. Barrett did and in con-
nection therewith planted alfalfa (Tr. pp. 101and247). 
The alfalfa itself was a benefit to the land and one which 
the plaintiffs and the defendant Leland H. Vickers 
received the benefits from and which the plaintiffs and 
the estate of Leland H. Vickers continue to harvest 
for their own use and benefit and which the court noted 1 
would continue to benefit the land for a period of ap-
proximately 25 years (Tr. pp. 100, 101 and 252). 
There was substantial expenditure for ditches 
which benefited the entire land, purchased (Tr. pp. 71, 
79 and 90 and the defendant's Exhibit 18). These vari· 
ous ditches and their maintenance were necessary in 
order to benefit from the dam which had been installed. 
Joseph S. Barrett also put in a substantial amount 
of fencing (Tr. pp. 71, 83, 84 and 107) all of which 
benefited the various co-tenants. 
Further, the court specifically found that clearing 
of the brush from the George Barretts' portion of the 
land, was a permanent "improvement to the land (Tr. 
p. 93) . The amount of the above expenses and others 
are set out in Defendant's Exhibit 18. 
If even the dam alone, without consideration to the 
above-mentioned items or the other contributions made 
by Joseph S. Barrett (Defendant's Exhibit 18) were 
taken into account, the plaintiffs the George C. Barretts 
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and the defendant Leland H. Vickers would each be 
indebted to the defendant in the sum of $121.05 plus 
mterest at six per cent as opposed to the $65.00 allowed 
by the court. The error of the trial court is clear. The 
entire question of improvements must be reviewed either 
by this court, if possible, or on retrial of the cause before 
the trial court. 
The defendant Joseph S. Barrett should be en-
titled to judgment in the amount of one-fourth of the 
reasonable value of all the improvements made upon 
the property as against the plaintiffs the George C. 
llarretts and one-fourth of the reasonable value of per-
manent improvements upon the property against the 
estate of Leland H. Vickers, together with interest on 
each sum at the rate of six per cent per annum from the 
date the improvements were completed. 
POINT VII 
THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO 
.MAKE A RULING IN THIS CASE AFTER 
THE TRIAL FOR A PERIOD IN EXCESS OF 
SIX YEARS CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE 
ERROR. 
Our legislature has recently declared that delay 
beyond a sixty day period is unreasonable unless circum-
stances causing such delay are beyond the personal con-
trol of the judge (Section 78-7-25 Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953 as amended). In addition the judge is 
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required to make a monthly written report to the Dis-
trict Court Administrator on all cases held by him under 
advisement which have been fully submitted for his con-
sideration and determination for a period of sixty days 
or more. (Section 78-7-26 Utah Code Annotated 1953 
as amended.) 
This attorney has been able to find no cases which 
have dealt with a situation where a trial judge pro-
crastinated for a period of six prior to handing 
down his ruling. The longest period of time found was 
a period of 21/2 years in the case of Dusbabek vs. Bowers, 
43 P.2d 97, 173 Okl. 53 ( 1934). That case held that the 
trial judge had not lost jurisdiction through failure to 
enter the judgment and the parties had not been preju-
diced thereby. 
The only Utah case found dealing specifically with 
delay in entry of judgment is a criminal case Kolb vs. 
Peterson, 168 Pac. 97, 50 Utah 450 ( 1917), which held 
that in a criminal action the court did not lose jurisdic· 
tion of the case thus making the sentence illegal where 
the court failed to enter judgment within a period of 
two days as required by Section 5154 Compiled Laws 
of Utah 1907 but rather delayed judgment for a period 
of six days after the sentence was rendered. 
In the present case the wife of the defendant Joseph 
S. Barrett has died since the trial of this case and due 
to the extreme delay the only attorney now representing 
the parties in the action who appeared at the trial of 
the cause is the attorney for the plaintiffs. It is a prac-
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tical improbability and a realistic assumption that the 
trial judge could not retain the facts of this trial in his 
memory for a period in excess of six years and then 
make a decision based upon the evidence placed before 
him at the trial even with the use of notes taken at the 
trial. The reality of the trial judge's fallible memory 
is evidenced by his Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law which are replete with errors, assertions and 
conclusions in clear contradiction to the testimony en-
tered at trial as transcribed and presently available to 
this court. 
POINT VIII 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING 
THAT THE PROPERTY WAS A PROPER 
SUBJECT FOR PARTITION. 
The first trial on this case determined the property 
could not be equitably partitioned. The trial court, how-
eYer, did not make a ruling with regard to sale and 
diYision of the proceeds. This court's decision in that 
case was to the effect that if a proper petition is made 
for partition or sale of the property the petitioner is 
entitled to one of the two remedies (Barrett vs. Vickers, 
362 P.2d 586, 12 Utah 2d 73 ( 1961) ) . The case was 
remanded to the trial court for further action consistent 
with that decision. This court did not in that case over-
rule the trial judge's decision that the property could 
not be partitioned. The proper action and disposition 
of the case once received again by the trial court should 
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have been for a determination of the credits and in-
terest of the parties and procedures and arrangement 
for sale and division of the proceeds. Retrying the 
question as to whether or not the property could be 
partitioned was beyond the authority of the court and 
contrary to the decision and directive of this court to 
process the matter in accordance with the opinion 
handed down. 
In the subsequent trial of the matter the testimony 
again was contrary to a partition.Joseph S. Barrett stat· 
ed that he did not believe the property could be divided, 
that it would be an injury to the overall value of the 
property and could be done only at a great loss (Tr. 
p. 76). None of the parties indicated satisfaction with 
the division of the property as it had been temporarily 
dividend and was being used. Even the plaintiff George 
Barrett, who recommended a division which would place 
one-quarter section more in the area in which he would 
participate (Tr. p. 150) was not satisfied. He testified 
that if the property were divided as he proposed that it 
be divided he would not be satisfied with any portion 
of the property except that particular portion which 
he had previously selected and had previously been using 
(Tr. pp. 85, 185, 189, 190, 200 and 201). The evidence 
is amply clear that the ranch is small and in its entirety 
would support only minimal crops or a small herd of 
sheep or cattle (Tr. pp. 181, 182, and 183). Further 
the water rights to the ranch were of such a nature that 
if divided further would result in inadequate irrigation 
(Tr. pp. 179, 215). 
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POINT IX 
THE PARTITION ORDERED BY THE 
COPRT IS IN ERROR. 
Section 78-39-12 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as 
amended states: 
. . . upon the requisite proofs being made, it 
(the court) must order a partition according to 
the respective rights of the parties as ascertained 
by the court and appoint three referees therefor, 
... ( e.a.) 
Thereafter Section 78-39-13 and Section 78-39-U 
specify the duties and powers of the referees and the 
procedure to be used in their report. In the present case 
no referees were appointed by the court, an omission in 
dear violation of the statute and which constitutes re-
,-ersible error. 
A partition must in every case be equitable and no 
one given an unnecessary advantage. (In Re Fergu-
sun's Estate, 139 Pac. 438, 44 Utah 234 ( 1914) ) . Un-
der the Judgment as outlined by the court, the stockyard 
area which the plaintiff George C. Barrett testified 
had as much value as the residential areas and was 
worth as much as the cultivatable ground (Tr. p. 191), 
was awarded to the plaintiffs, including all of the stock-
yard fences and corral work, most of which was installed 
by the defendant Joseph S. Barrett. The dwelling 
t'onstructed by the defendant Joseph S. Barrett, upon 
the farm was likewise awarded, together with the resi-
dential parcel No. 3, to the plaintiffs. The cultivatable 
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portions of the land serviced by the ditches dug by the 
defendant Joseph S. Barrett were awarded to the plain. 
tiffs and Leland H. Vickers Estate. The property pro-
tected by the fences erected by Joseph S. Barrett was 
awarded to the plaintiffs and Leland H. Vickers Estate . 
. Much of the Alfalfa planted by the defendant Joseph 
S. Barrett was awarded to the plaintiffs and to tht 
Leland H. Vickers Estate and the land cleared by the 
defendant Joseph S. Barrett of brush and debris was 
awarded by the court to the plaintiffs. 
All of the above was ordered by the court under 
the guise of justice while at the same time the court 
denied to the defendant, Joseph S. Barrett, the right 
of recovery for expenditures in establishing these im-
provements. All of which brings us as far from the 
equitable mandate of In Re Ferguson's Estate as the 
trial court could possibly have strayed without following 
the division suggested in court by the plaintiff, George 
C. Barrett (Tr. pp. 149 and 150}. 
POINT X 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT 
EACH OF THE PARTIES HAD AN UN-
DIVIDED ONE-FOURTH INTEREST IN THE 
LAND AND 'VERE ENTITLED TO A POR-
TION THEREOF APPROXIl\IATELY EQUAL 
TO ONE-FOURTH THE VALUE. 
The original decision of Judge 'Vill L. Hoyt, (De· 
fendant' s Exhibit 2) , which was affirmed by this court 
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in the case of Barrett vs. Vickers, 116 P.2d 772, 100 
Ctah 534 ( 1941), stated in paragraph l, page 2 of the 
Judgment: 
that the plaintiff's are the owners and holders 
in their own rights of an undivided one-fourth 
interest in and to the following described contract 
and the property rights represented thereby, ... 
( e.a.) 
and in paragraph 2 that each of the defendants with 
their respective wives were the owners of an undivided 
one-fourth interest in "said contract." 
In this court's decision in that case, the court spe-
cifically avoided the issue here in question when it stated 
at page 775 of the Pacific Reporter: 
Until one party or another has defaulted in his 
share of the payment, the issue of whether or not 
the others, if they pay his share, may increase 
their interest, does not arise. That question is 
not before us in this case. 
The other parties having now defaulted in their 
share of the payments and such payments having been 
made by the defendant Joseph S. Barrett, the defend-
ant Joseph S. Barrett has become equitably entitled to 
a proportionately larger share. Especially would this 
be so where no effort has been made by the defaulting 
parties to reimburse Joseph S. Barrett for the monies 
necessarily advanced in the preservation of the contract 
oYer a period of 24 years. (Knesek v. Munzy, 129 P.2d 
853, 35 Okl. 1343 (1942). 
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When Joseph S. Barrett paid the balance of the 
payments due and owing to the State Land Board, he 
became, as properly determined by the trial court, sub-
rogated to the rights of the State Land Board. It is 
imminently clear that had the co-tenants defaulted and 
had the defendant Joseph S. Barrett not paid their in-
dividual shares, the State Land Board would have fore-
closed the contract and all of the parties would have 
forfeited their interests therein and received nothing 
for their investments. (Paragraph 4 C of Defendant's 
Exhibit No. 1). 
It is also clear that if the property were sold by the 
parties to raise money to pay the State Land Hoard, 
each of the parties would have been entitled to receive 
benefits from the sale of the property equal to the pro-
portionate shares contributed by them in payment over 
and above the amounts necessary to satisfy the claims ot' 
the State Land Board. Being now subrogated to the 
rights of the State Land Board, Joseph S. Barrett 
would be entitled in such an event to that portion which 
would have gone to the State Land Board had it not 
been cleared from the contract. How then can it be said 
if the property is partitioned in lieu of being sold with 
the proceeds of the sale divided pursuant to the equities 
of the parties, that the defendant Joseph S. Barrett 
should receive less? 
The provisions of Section 78-39-12 of the Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, must surely antici-
pate that the parties to a partition would receive equal 
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and equitable treatment under either of the two alterna-
tiYes. Joseph S. Barrett would therefore be entitled 
to an award of property equal proportionately to the 
amount of his investment therein. 
The same would apply with regard to costs and 
expenses advanced by Joseph S. Barrett for the im-
proYement and protection of the property. In the case 
of Ames vs. Ames, 225 P.2d 85 170 Kan. 227 (1950) 
the court stated at page 88 of the Pacific Reporter: 
The extent to which the improvements en-
hanced the value of the land was clearly a neces-
sary and indispensable consideration in a just 
and equitable partition and settlement of the 
rights of the co-tenants in and to the proceeds 
of the sale. 
Here again if the defendant Joseph S. Barrett 
would receive a proportionately full reimbursement 
for the improvements to the property from the other 
co-tenants in the event of a sale of the property, he 
certainly could not in justice and equity be placed in 
a less secure position by a partition of the property. 
The court should, therefore, have made a deter-
mination as to the fractional interests of the various 
parties and then appointed referees to study the prop-
erty and develop a plan of partition equated to the 
fractional equities of the co-tenants. 
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Point XI 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE DECREED 
THAT THE l\IONEY GRANT. 
ED BY THE COURT \VEHE EXPRESS AND 
PRIOR LIENS AGAINST THE PROPERTY 
PARTITIONED AND A"'ARDED TO THE 
CO-TENANTS. 
If the court should hold that each party in spite 
of his contribution or lack thereof toward the purchase 
contract retained a one-fourth interest in and to the 
entire tract of land then as an absolute minimum to 
protect the interest and rights of the defendant Joseph 
S. Barrett the court should have decreed that the money 
judgments granted by the court were express and prior 
liens against the property dating to the date of his 
payment of the disproportionate share and to the dates 
of payments and expenditures for the improvement and 
preservation of the property. 
There could have been no partition without paying 
out the contract to the State Land Board and getting 
title and there was danger that the contract would be 
forfeited by the state during the litigation. Under the 
circumstances and at the urging of the trial court 
Joseph S. Barrett paid the balance due on the contract 
for the benefit of the co-tenants. This payment entitled 
him to an equitable lien upon the interests of the other 
co-tenants to secure contribution based upon principles 
of equity and not upon contract. 
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A suit for partition is an equitable proceeding, 
and it is a general rule that all equities should be con-
sidered and appropriate adjustments made. ( 68 C.J .S. 
p. i08 et seq., Akley v. Bassett, 209 P. 576, 189 Cal. 625 
I 1922) ) . 
In Vol. 2 LeoTULrd A. Jones Treatise on the Law 
of Liens, 3rd edition, Edward .M. White, Bobbs Mer-
rill Co., 1914 Ind. pp. 395 and 396, the author states: 
In the case of a joint purchase of land, an ex-
cess of purchase-money paid by one of the pur-
chasers is a lien upon the interest of the other. 
'\Vhere the adventure is joint, each is entitled to 
participate equally in it, without regard to equali-
ty of payment; but it iJJ a clear principal of equity, 
that the common property will be held bound 
for any excess paid by one over the other . . . 
(e.a.) 
. . . If one tenant in common redeems a mort-
gage upon the property held in common, he ac-
quires an equitable lien upon the interests of his 
cotenant for the payment of his proportion of 
the redemption money; and a court of equity will 
enforce such lien by decreeing that the interest 
of such cotenant shall be sold in case of his de-
fault in repaying such money, and that the pro-
ceeds shall be applied to the extinguishment of 
the lien. 
See also: Calkins v. Steinbeck, 4P. 1103, 66 Cal. 117 
(1884) ;Koboliska v. Swehla, 77 NW 576, 107 Iowa 
li.J, (1898); Thurston v. Holden, 265 P. 697, 45 Ida. 
7i.J, ( 1928) and Knesek v. Muzny, 129 P.2d 853, 35 
Okl. 1343 (1942). 
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It would seem strange indeed, if the co-tenan() 
were entitled to a decree partitioning the property fret 
of any lien when under the circumstances the property 
could not have been partitioned at all without 
the debt to the state. Equity will surely not permit such 
an injustice. 
\\Tith respect to the claims of Joseph S. Barrett 
for contribution for necessary repairs and improve· 
ments, the trial court obviously intended to and did 
rule that . necessary repairs and improvements were 
made by Joseph S. Barrett on the property. Some of 
these improvements benefited the entire land such as 
dam, others benefited specific portions of the land. 
Since the rights of the parties are based upon equitable 
principles it would be manifestly inequitable to permit 
the co-tenants whose property has been repaired or 
improved to have the benefit of such repairs and im-
provements without contributing his, or her, share of 
the expense. The rule with respect to necessary repairs 
is clearly stated at 2 Jones on Liens, Supra pages 146 
and 147 as follows: 
One joint tenant or tenant in common has a 
lien upon his cotenant' s interest in the property 
for the expense of necessary and useful repairs 
made upon it whereby a common benefit has 
been conferred on the owners, so that ex aequo 
et bono they ought to pay for such a benefit. 
Unless the property could be so charged for such 
repairs, which one tenant is willing to make, the 
property might remain unfit for use, and worth-
less or unprofitable to both tenants. One tenant 
28 
should not .forced to let his prope1ty yo to ruin, 
or to sell his interest, because his cotenant is un-
willing or unable to make the necessary repairs. 
Neither should the tenant who is willing to incur 
the cost of making such repairs be forced to do so 
at his own expense without security for the re-
payment of his cotenant's share, but the law 
should afford him immediate security there/ or 
by means of a lien upon his cotenanfs interest. 
( e.a.) 
The repair of the dam, the fences, the ditches and 
other repairs testified to by defendant Joseph S. Barrett 
(Defendant's Exhibit 18) would certainly come under 
this rule. 
In 1 Tiffany Real Property, Second Edition, Cal-
laghan & Co., 1920, Chicago, pp. 687 and 688, it is 
stated: 
In equity it has been held that a cotenant who 
makes improvements in good faith may be en-
titled, on partition of the property, to have as-
signed him as his share the portion which he has 
improved, if this can be done without injury to 
the other cotenants; and, when this cannot be 
done, the other cotenants may be required, as a 
condition of partition, to pay to the improving 
tenant the amount to whioh their shares have 
been benefited by the improvements made b.lJ him 
in good faith, or he may be allowed for them out 
of the proceeds of the sale of the property in the 
partition proceeding . . . ( e.a.) 
See also 86 C. J. S., p. 451, where the rule for the 
application of equitable principles is discussed: 
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Under certain circumstances, however, a ten-
ant in may enforce contribution for per-
manent improvements or secure an allowance u! 
compensa_tion therefor in equitable proceeding1: 
and, as discussed in Partition Sec. 139, the gen-
eral rule is that, where a cotenant places im-
provements on the common property, equity will, 
in partition proceedings, take this fact into con-
sideration, and in some way compensate him 
therefor, as, for example, by an allotment of the 
portion of the land on which the improvements 
are placed to him as his share, without regard 
to its enhanced value by reason of such improYe-
ments, or, where it is impossible so to allot the 
improvements to him, requiring the other co-
tenants to pay to him their proportionate share 
of the enhancement of value resulting from such 
improvement. Likewise, on an accounting mul 
distribution of the estate, as in the case of an 
intestate succession, or distribution of the pro-
ceeds of a sale thereof, an allowance may be made 
to a cotenant who has, in ,good faith, placed im-
provements on the comrnon premises for the com· 
mon benefit, enhancing their value. A cotenant's 
right to compensation for improvements made 
by him on the common property is primarily a 
question for the court, and the court will 
mine the right to relief on the basis of the appli-
cation of the equitable principles involved to the 
factual showing of the individual case. ( e.a.) 
In 40 Am. Jur. p. 32, the rule is stated thus: 
'Vhile at common law a tenant in common 
could not claim contribution in an action at law 
for partition of the property for necessary 
provements made on. the common_ wit?· 
out the consent of his cotenant, m eqmty a d1f-
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ferent rule applies, and the court acting on the 
maxim 'he who seeks equity must do equity' will 
take such improvements into consideration in de-
creeing a partition, even though made without 
consent or promise of contribution, provided they 
are necessary, useful, substantial and permanent 
enhancing the value of the estate. This rule has 
been adopted and applied, with but rare excep-
tions, in every jurisdiction where the action for 
partition is considered as one calling for equit-
able interposition and relief. (See cases therein 
cited.) 
See also: Dahlhammer v. Schneider, 252 P.2d 807, 
197 or 478 ( 1953) ; Ventre v. Tiscornia, 138 P. 954, 
Cal. 598 (1913); and Indra v. Wiggins, 28 N\V (2d) 
485, 238 Iowa 729 ( 1947). 
The practical result of a lien establi$hed as of the 
time of the advancement of the funds is to guarantee 
to the parties so advancing funds, on a joint purchase 
contract or advancing funds for the improvement of 
property owned by co-tenants, the benefit of their in-
Yestment. It prevents co-tenants who cannot or will 
not advance their share from benefiting from their in-
action. It prevents intervening lien holders whose rights 
might become fixed prior to the date of judgment, from 
divesting the co-tenant advancing the money of the 
benefit of his contribution. Such a rule of law likewise 
prevents occurrences, such as those anticipated by Sec-
tion 78-22-1.1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amend-
ed, from divesting the co-tenant of his investment 
through circumstances which could conceivably com-
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pletely drain a small estate of funds, including pro. 
ceeds of the sale of the property, through prioritv 
claims of last illness and probate fees and expenses. 
is the potential in the present case as relates to the 
estate of Leland H. Vickers. 
Point XII 
THE COURT'S GRANTING OF JUDG. 
MENT ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFFS 
AGAINST THE LELAND H. VICKERS ES. 
TATE 'iVAS ERROR. 
This judgment is obviously some portion or rem· 
nant of the original judgment granted by Judge Will 
L. Hoyt on August 15, 1940. That judgment is no 
longer enforceable, the Statute of Limitations having 
expired long before the trial in the present case. 
It may not be readily apparent that defendant 
Joseph S. Barrett would be properly concerned with 
a judgment granted by the court on behalf of the plain· 
tiffs against the estate of defendant Leland H. Vickers, 
however, as alluded to above the preservation of the 
Leland H. Vickers Estate is of direct concern to Joseph 
S. Barrett for purposes of satisfying his own judgment 
against the estate. 
The granting of this judgment against the estate 
of Leland H. Vickers serves merely to transfer to the 
plaintiff's additional funds which might otherwise be 
available to the satisfaction of the judgment by Joseph 
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S. Barrett. This is particularly so, in the light of the 
fact that one of the plaintiffs has placed herself in the 
contradictory position of both plaintiff and defendant, 
being the Administratrix of the Leland H. Vickers 
Estate. The conflicting of this anomalo-w; 
situation is undoubtedly more than clear to the court 
and it is suggested is of itself reversible error. 
CONCLUSIONS 
From the foregoing the defendant Joseph S. Bar-
rett makes the following conclusions : 
The property should not have been partitioned. 
A sale should have been ordered and the property sold 
and the proceeds divided according to the interests of 
the parties. The equities of the co-tenants should be 
properly determined and a share of the proceeds of the 
sale proportionate to his overall contributions toward 
the purchase contract and improvements and preserva-
tion of the property should be awarded to Joseph S. 
Barrett. In this regard the minimum amount of in-
debtedness to be determined as against the plaintiffs 
would be $1,152.56 as of June 21, 1969, plus $121.05 
together with interest thereon at the rate of six per 
cent per annum from the date the dam was completed 
and such additional amount together with interest 
thereon at six per cent per annum from the dates of 
each expenditure as the court determines to have been 
a necessary expenditure in the preservation of the 
property and/or a permanent improvement thereon. 
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The minimum amount of indebtedness to be determined 
as against the estate of Leland H. Vickers would be 
$2,231.61 as of June 21, 1969 plus $121.05 together 
with interest thereon at six per cent per annum from 
the date the dam was completed and such additional 
amount together with interest thereon at six per cent 
per annum from the dates of each expenditure as the 
court determines to have been a necessary expenditure 
in the preservation of the property and/or a permanent 
improvement thereon. 
If the court determines the trial court was correct 
in its decision that the property should be partitioned, 
then a determination should be made as to the equities 
of the parties in the property based upon their contri· 
butions toward purchase price, improvements and neces-
sary repairs. Referees should be appointed to study the 
property and a division made thereof between the par· 
ties proportionate to their equities. 
If the court should hold that each party is entitled 
to a division of the property equal to one-fourth of the 
value thereof then an express equitable lien dating to 
the date of contribution toward the purchase price 
and to the dates of payments made for preservation 
and improvement of the property should be declared 
so as to secure to the defendant Joseph S. Barrett the 
benefits of his investment and so as to prevent the 
plaintiffs and the estate of Leland H. Vickers from 
benefiting and profiting from their inaction and becom· , 
ing unjustly enriched thereby. 
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If the court finds that from the evidence and testi-
mony now before it, it cannot make a ruling consistent 
with the above then the case should be remanded to 
the trial court for a new trial with specific and definite 
instructions and an outline as to the law governing 
the fact situation of the parties so as to effect a dispo-
sition thereof which is as prompt and equitable as pos-
sible. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. EARL GREENWOOD, JR. 
JAY A. MESERVY 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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APPENDIX "A" 
Payments made by 
Joseph S. and E. V. 
Harrett 
l)a.te Payment 
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Payments made by 
Leland H. Vickers 
Date Payment 






Payment of Sterling and 
Ethelyn Vickers 
Date Pa.lJment 









a pf (_ I/ .._,/I 't. I LELAND \4 PA y ABLE 
No.of Tota! Bal. Bal. if Amount 11% Int. 8% lnL B % Int. Days PaY1nea1r Owill&' on Sched. Past Due Increase Payment Balance 
4-4-40 Beginning balance 
6-1-40 Interest to due date 58 758.81 
758.81 
10-5-40 Payment 0 763.70 738.84 
24.86 
12-1-40 Interest to due date 
126 47.84 726.90 738.84 0 .70 .70 0 
6-1-41 
57 731.50 718.87 12.63 Interest to due date 182 
12-1-41 Interest to due date 746.04 
698.90 47.14 .51 .51 
12-2-41 
183 760.25 678.93 81.32 1.92 2.43 
6-1-42 
Payment 1 50.00 712.78 678.93 33.85 .02 2.45 0 
10-2-42 
Interest to due date 181 726.43 658.96 67.47 1.36 1.36 Payment 
12-1-42 Interest to due date 
123 34.22 704.42 658.96 45.46 1.84 3.20 0 
60 708.81 638.99 69.82 .61 .61 6-1-43 TntPrest to due date 182 721.73 619.02 102.71 2.82 3.43 12-1-43 Interest to due date 183 734.32 599.05 135.27 4.18 7.61 6-1-44 Interest to due date 182 746.43 579.08 167.35 5.47 13.08 7-11-44 Payment 40 32.20 731.37 579.08 152.29 1.49 14.57 0 11-30-44 Payment 142 31.62 713.70 579.08 134.62 4.81 4.81 0 
12-1-44 Interest to due date 1 713.76 559.11 154.65 .03 .03 
6-1-45 Interest to due date 182 725.07 539.14 185.93 6.25 6.28 
12-1-45 Interest to due date 183 736.03 519.17 216.86 7.56 13.84 
6-1-46 Interest to due date 182 746.53 499.20 247.33 8.77 26.61 
12-1-46 Interest to due date 183 756.68 479.23 277.45 10.06 32.67 
6-1-47 Interest to due date 182 766.37 459.26 307.11 11.22 43.89 
12-1-47 Interest to due date 183 775.71 439.29 336.42 12.49 56.38 
5-1-48 Interest to due date 182 784.59 419.32 365.27 13.61 69.99 
12-1-48 Interest to due date 183 793.12 399.35 393.77 14.85 84.84 
6-1-49 Interest to due date 182 801.20 379.38 421.82 15.93 100.77 
12-1-49 Interest to due date 183 808.91 359.41 449.50 17.15 117.92 
6-1-50 Interest to due date 182 816.18 339.44 476.44 18.18 136.10 
12-1-50 Interest to due date 183 823.08 319.47 503.61 19.38 155.48 
6-1-51 Interest to due date 182 829.54 299.50 530.04 20.37 175.85 
12-1-51 Interest to due date 183 835.63 279.53 556.10 21.55 197.40 
6-1-52 Interest to due date 182 841.28 259.56 581.72 22.49 219.89 
12-1-52 Interest to due date 183 846.56 239.59 606.97 23.66 243.55 
6-1-53 Interest to due date 182 851.41 219.62 631.79 24.55 268.10 
12-1-53 Interest to due date 183 855.88 199.65 656.23 25.69 293.79 
6-1-54 Interest to due date 182 859.92 179.68 680.24 26.54 
320.33 
12-1-54 Interest to due date 183 863.57 159. 71 703.86 27.66 
347.99 
6-1-55 Interest to due date 182 866.80 139.74 727.06 28.47 
376.46 
12-1-55 Interest to due date 183 869.64 119.77 749.87 29.57 
406.03 
6-1-56 Interest to due date 182 872.06 99.80 772.26 30.33 
436.36 
12-1-56 Interest to due date 183 874.09 79.83 794.26 31.41 
467.77 
6-1-57 Interest to due date 182 875.70 59.86 815.84 32.12 
499.89 
12-1-57 Interest to due date 183 876.92 39.89 837.03 33.18 
533.07 
6-1-58 Interest to due date 182 877.73 19.92 857.81 
33.85 566.92 
12-1-58 Interest to due date 183 878.13 0 878.13 
34.88 601.80 
6-21-69 Interest to date ofjudgment 3852 878.13 0 751.68 
1,353.48 
SUMMARY 
Bal. past due $ 878.13 
8% Int. owing 1,353.48 
$2,231.61 
38 39 
GEORGE BAf PAYABLE 
No.of Tobi ,..i Bal. Bal. if Amount 
8% Int. 8% Int. I% Int. 
Days PaYIDei: owing on Sched. Past Due Increase 
Payment Balance 
4-4-40 Beginning Bal. 
6-1-40 Interest to due date 758.81 
758.81 
10-5-40 Payment 
58 0 763.70 738.84 24.86 
12-1-40 Interest to due date 
126 143.53 I 631.21 738.84 0 
.70 .70 0 
6-1-40 Interest to due date 
56 0 635.13 718.87 0 
10-7-41 Payment 
182 0 647 97 698.90 0 
12-1-41 Interest to due date 
128 135.64 521.55 698.90 0 
3-31-42 Payment 
54 0 524.68 678.93 0 
6-1-42 Interest to due date 
120 36.5! 1 495.17 678.93 0 
10-3-42 Payment 
61 0 498.53 658.96 0 
12-1-42 Interest to due date 
124 34.22 471.18 658.96 0 
6-1-43 
58 0 474.22 638.99 0 
12-1-43 
Interest to due date 182 0 483.81 619.02 0 
6-1-44 
Interest to due date 183 0 493.65 599.05 0 
12-1-44 
Interest to due date 182 0 503.63 579.08 0 
3-31-45 
Interest to due date 183 0 513.87 559.11 0 
5-28-45 
Payment 120 34.18 486.54 559.11 0 
6-1-45 
Payment 58 124.61 365.07 559.11 0 
Interest to due date 4 365.23 539.14 0 
12-1-45 Interest to due date 
6-1-46 
183 372.66 519.17 0 
Interest to due date 182 380.20 499.20 0 
12-1-46 Interest to due date 183 387.93 479.23 0 
6-1-47 Interest to due date 182 39577 459.26 0 
12-1-47 Interest to due date 183 403.82 439.29 0 
6-1-48 Interest to due date 182 411.99 419.32 0 
12-1-48 
6-1-49 
Interest to due date 183 420.37 399.35 21.02 
Interest to due date 182 428.45 379.38 49.07 
.85 .85 
12-1-49 Interest to due date 183 436.16 359.41 76.75 
2.00 2.85 
6-1-50 Interest to due date 182 443 43 339.44 103.99 
3.10 5.95 
12-1-50 Interest to due date 183 450.33 319.47 130.86 
4.23 10.18 
6-1-51 Interest to due date 182 456.79 299.50 157.29 
5.29 15.47 
12-1-51 Interest to due date 183 462.88 279.53 183.35 
6.40 21.87 
6-1-52 Interest to due date 182 468.53 259.56 
208.97 7.42 29.29 
12-1-52 Interest to due date 183 473.81 239.59 
234.22 8.50 37.79 
6-1-53 Interest to due date 182 478.66 219.62 
259.04 9.47 47.26 
12-1-53 Interest to due date 183 483.13 199.65 
283.48 10.53 57.79 
6-1-54 Interest to due date 182 487 .17 179.68 
307.49 11.47 69.26 
12-1-54 Interest to due date 183 490.82 159.71 
331.11 12.44 81.70 
6-1-55 Interest to due date 182 494.05 139.74 
354.31 13.39 95.09 
12-1-55 Interest to due date 183 496.89 119.77 
377.12 14.41 109.50 
6-1-56 Interest to due date 182 499.31 99.80 
399.51 15.25 124.75 
12-1-56 Interest to due date 183 501.34 79.83 
421.51 16.24 140.99 
6-1-57 Interest to due date 182 502.95 59.86 
443.09 17.05 158.04 
12-1-57 Interest to due date 183 504.17 39.89 
464.28 18.02 176.06 
6-1-58 Interest to due date 182 504.98 19.92 
485.06 18.78 194.84 
12-1-58 Interest to due date 183 505.38 0 
505.38 19.73 214.57 
432.61 647.18 
6-21-69 Interest to date ofjudgment 3852 
SUMMARY 
Bal. past due $ 505.38 
8% Int. owing 647.18 
Total owing $1,152.56 
40 41 
STERLING 11 p:\YABLE 
No.of Totai 11 Bal. Bal. if 
Amount 8% Int. 8% Int. 8 % lat. 
Days PaY'ln!t owing on Scheel. Past Due 
Increase Payment Balance 




rnterest to due date 58 0 763 70 738.84 24.86 Payment 
12-1-40 Interest to due date 
126 47.84 I 726.90 738.84 
0 .70 .70 0 
6-1-41 
57 73150 718.87 12.63 
12-1-41 
Interest to due date 182 "46 04 698.90 47.14 .51 
.lH 
12-5-41 
Interest to due date 183 760.25 678.93 81.32 
1.92 2.43 
6-1-42 
Payment 4 50.0(: 1 il:l 05 678.93 34.12 
.07 2.50 0 
10-3-42 
Interest to due date 178 726.48 658.96 67.52 1.35 
1.35 
Payment 124 658.96 46.26 1.86 
3.21 0 
12-1-42 Interest to due date 59 
33.55 705.22 638.99 70.55 .61 
.81 
6-1-43 Interest to due date 182 
709.54 619.02 103.44 2.85 
3.46 
8-9-43 Payment 69 
722.46 619.02 47.00 1.59 5.05 
0 
12-1-43 Interest to due date 114 
66.24 I 666 02 599.05 74.81 1.19 
1.19 
3-2-44 Payment 91 
673 86 599.05 17.89 1.51 2.70 
0 
6-1-44 Interest to due date 
65.68 616.94 579.08 43.92 .36 
.36 
91 623.00 
7-11-44 Payment 40 32.19 594.13 579.08 15.05 
.39 .75 0 
11-30-44 Payment 142 31.62 572.12 579.08 0 
.47 .47 0 
12-1-44 Interest to due date 1 559.11 13.07 
0 
6-1-45 Interest to due date 182 583.49 539.14 44.35 
.53 .53 
7-11-45 Payment 40 541.59 45.22 539.14 0 
.39 .92 0 
12-1-45 Interest to due date 143 45.94 519.17 
6-1-46 Interest to due date 182 46 87 499.20 
12-1-46 Interest to due date 183 47.82 479.23 
6-1-47 Interest to due date 182 48 79 459.26 
12-1-47 Interest to due date 183 49 78 439.29 
6-1-48 Interest to due date 182 50.79 419.32 
12-1-48 Interest to due date 183 51.82 399.35 
6-1-49 Interest to due date 182 52.87 379.38 
12-1-49 Interest to due date 183 53 95 359.41 
6-1-50 Interest to due date 182 55.04 339.44 
12-1-50 Interest to due date 183 56 16 319.47 
6-1-51 Interest to due date 182 57.30 299.50 
12-1-51 Interest to due date 183 58.4 7 279.53 
6-1-52 Interest to due date 182 'i9.65 259.56 
12-1-52 Interest to due date 183 60.86 239.59 
6-1-53 Interest to due date 182 62 09 
219.62 
12-1-53 Interest to due date 183 63.35 
199.65 
6-1-54 Interest to due date 182 64 63 
179.68 
12-1-54 Interest to due date 183 65 94 
159.71 
6-1-55 Interest to due date 182 
67 27 139.74 
12-1-55 Interest to due date 183 
68.64 119.77 
6-1-56 Interest to due date 182 
70.03 99.80 
12-1-56 Interest to due date 183 
71 45 79.83 13.03 
6-1-57 Interest to due date 182 
72.89 59.86 .53 .53 
12-1-57 Interest to due date 183 
74.11 39.89 34.22 1.38 
1.91 
6-1-58 Interest to due date 182 
74.92 19.92 55.00 2.24 
4.15 
12-1-58 Interest to due date 183 
75.33 0 75.33 64.43 
68.63 
6-21-69 Interest to date ofjudgmen• 3852 
0 
SUMMARY $75.33 Bal. owing 
8% Loan 68.63 




No. of TOii! al Bal. Bal. if 
Amount 8% Int. 8% Int. 8 % Int. 
Days PaYll!!t owinr on Sched. Pa.st Due Increase Payment 
Balance 
1-4-40 Beginning Balance ;SB.Bl 758.81 6-1-40 Interest to due date 58 738.84 24.86 10-5-40 Payment 126 0 
763.70 738.84 0 .70 .70 0 
12-1-40 47.Bj 726.89 Interest to due date 57 73149 718.87 12.62 6-1-41 Interest to due date 182 746.03 698.90 47.13 .51 
.51 
12-1-41 Interest to due date 183 760.24 678.93 81.31 1.92 
2.43 
6-1-42 Interest to due date 182 773.97 658.96 115.01 3.29 
5.72 
10-2-42 Payment 123 34.23 i57 61 658.96 98.65 3.14 
8.86 0 
12-1-42 Interest to due date 60 76187 638.99 122.88 1.32 
1.32 
3-31-43 Payment 120 135.25 " 639. 74 638.99 .75 
3.28 4.60 0 
6-1-43 Interest to due date 62 644.14 619.02 25.12 .01 
.01 
8-10-43 Payment 619.02 0 .39 .40 0 70 66.24 5B3.ll 12-1-43 Interest to due date 113 390.43 599.05 0 
3-2-44 Payment 91 65.68 530.72 599.05 0 6-1-44 Interest to due date 91 536.09 579.08 
7-11-44 Payment 40 32.20 506.27 579.08 10-5-44 Payment 86 32.60 478.51 579.08 12-1-44 Payment 57 31.62 449.92 559.11 6-1-45 Interest to due date 182 459.02 539.14 
7-11-45 Payment 40 541.59 IB0.33) 539.14 
7-11-45 Payment 0 541.59 ,622.12) 
3-26 46 Payment 115 557.09 I 179 21) 
44 45 
